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I.

Introduction

If globalization is the main paradigm of our time, then a chapter on globalization and law
could also be entitled, simply, the law of our time. Few, if any, areas of law are not—at
least potentially—fundamentally impacted by globalization. In reality, of course, the
impact of globalization on legal thought has, so far, been more limited. That has various
reasons. A first reason is that globalization, although (or perhaps because) it is generally
accepted as the new paradigm of society, has remained a remarkably vague concept in
general discourse. The fundamental debates over globalization of the 1990s more or less
petered out, without leading to a clear consensus. A second reason is that legal thought
has so far reacted to globalization not with a true paradigm shift but instead by more and
more inapt attempts to adapt the methodological nationalism that has provided its
paradigm for the last two hundred years or so. The same can still be said about much of
social theory, which also remains within such a state paradigm. Globalization has not, yet,
led to a true paradigm shift.
A third reason, finally, is that globalization poses interdisciplinary challenges, and
interdisciplinarity in law and globalization is still surprisingly lacking. On the one hand,
many of the conceptual and theoretical discussions of globalization ignore or downplay
the law as an important factors (beyond an occasional nod to international law). A
widespread understanding of globalization distinguishes three aspects: economics, culture,
politics. Law, in the words, is absent. In legal thinking, on the other hand, globalization is
ofteneither purely absent (where discussions are purely doctrinal) or appears as a simple
idea of internationalization that somehow influences the law. On the other hand, legal
theory and doctrine have, until recently, often operated with oversimplified concepts of
globalization.1
This suggests what this chapter needs to accomplish. In the second section, I try to
clarify the concept of globalization by introducing three different types of concept:
globalization as reality, as theory, and as ideology. This discussion, just as the rest of the
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chapter, remains necessarily abstract in two ways. First, it remains abstract from
particular areas in which globalization and law meet—human rights, international
economic law, family law, etc. Such areas are used as mere examples. The reason is that
globalization is not confined to these areas of the law; it permeates all of law and thus
matters everywhere. Second, the chapter remains abstract from specific theories.
Globalization is not a single theory or even a cluster of theories. Rather, it is the emerging
paradigm underlying all current theories of both state and law. Instead of presenting
individual theories of globalization, I present what all of them have in common.
In the third section, I discuss what I consider the core theme of globalization—the
transformation of the state, both empirically and theoretically. The state has long
provided the tacit framework for our thinking in both social and legal theory. If, as I
argue, globalization overcomes this focus, then a discussion of the transformation it
brings with it must put the state at its centre. My analysis therefore follows along the
traditional three elements of the state—territory, citizenship, and government and shows
how each of them is transformed.
The fourth section, finally, suggests a theory of globalization and law, called
transnational law. This may look like a legal, not a social theory, so some methodological
points should be made here. Although I begin by explaining globalization and then focus
more on the law, in this chapter, social and legal theory are not strictly kept apart. This
amalgamation performs one main thesis of the chapter. Globalization, I argue, is not an
external development that comes at the law from the outside. Rather, globalization and
law mutually shape each other—today’s globalization is as much a product of a law as it
influences the law. A proper theory of globalization must include the law; a proper theory
of the law must have a better idea of globalization. Moreover, just as globalization
challenges the distinction between the state and society, so it challenges the distinction
between social and legal theory. Legal theories must necessarily not just be influenced by
social theory; they must become social theories.2

II.

Three Types of Globalization

There is no universally accepted definition of globalization, and so this chapter will not
offer one. But that does not mean that no clarity can be achieved. Closer analysis of the
debates suggests that three different types of concept of globalization must be
distinguished. I call these three types globalization as reality, globalization as ideology,
and globalization as theory. Inside each type, fruitful debates can be had. Between the
types, however, such debates are less useful because the types are largely independent of
each other. All three types are relevant for the law, and I will discuss implications for the
law in each segment. However, I suggest that the last one—globalization as theory—is
the most important for legal thought, because paradigm shifts happen neither in reality
nor in ideology but in our ways of understanding the world.
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A.

Globalization as Reality

Globalization refers, first and foremost, to developments in the real world that are,
in some way, global. Many such developments are well-known. Some concern the
relations between states, in particular the growing interdependence. 3 —the increase in
global trade and global markets (made possible in part through liberalization of trade),
global communication (due in large part to the internet), global travel and global
migration, global networks (from online gamers to terrorists), global environmental
destruction and climate change, increased hybridity of cultures and societies, increased
influence of US values and culture on the rest of the world. All of these developments are
undoubtedly real— even though their extent is sometimes overestimated (for example,
most consumption is still domestic). But the question is whether all these events amount
to something categorically new that we should call globalization.
In response to these concerns, the most helpful analytics of globalization is still
one proposed by David Held et al in the late 1990s.4 They suggest that globalization is
characterized by four elements. The first three of these concerns global transactions, and
in particular their extensity, intensity, and velocity. Extensity describes the stretching of
activities across borders and distances. Intensity describes the magnitude of
interconnectedness inherent in these transactions. Velocity describes how these
transactions have gained in speed—if a letter from Europe to the United States used to
take a week, and a fax ten minutes, an e-mail, today, arrives instantly. The fourth factor
concerns what Held et al. sometimes call impact and sometimes the enmeshment
between the global and the local—the idea that local events can have global
consequences, and that on the other hand global developments materialize locally, often
with considerable variations. In this reading, there have been globalizations before our
time, but ours is the first that scores high on all four of these factors. The increase of
global transactions creates new challenges for legal transactions. The fourth, the
enmeshment between the global and the local, is reflected in the law in the increasingly
blurred lines between domestic and international law.
This analytics makes it possible to avoid a number of errors about globalization.
First, globalization is not a mere transfer of issues from a local to a supranational sphere,
which could be accompanied by a move from domestic to supranational law (as is the
case in the European Union, but not really on an international level). Nor does it seem
sufficient to think of the local and the global as distinct spheres that may interconnect—a
relation well known in law as the relation between domestic law and international law, to
be discussed later. Instead, what we find is that the local and the global mutually
constitute each other— Boaventura de Sousa Santos speaks, helpfully, of “globalized
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localism” and “localized globalism”.5 Global commerce relies, to a large extent, on local
laws and domestic enforcement mechanisms—its globalism is localized. Human rights
movements, on the other hand, attempt to achieve local policy changes by forming
networks—their localism is globalized.
Second, globalization is not merely uniformization. Although increased
communication and competition may sometimes lead towards uniformity—of culture, of
policies, and of laws—such uniformity always remains partial. In response to ideas of an
“end of history”, scholars have found that there are sustainable “varieties of capitalism”
in different capitalist countries.6 The same appears to be true in law—different countries
can still have different laws, and this may even be beneficial. Even where laws look the
same formally, their actual application often differs significantly.The same is true for
theses of an “americanization” of law. 7 Even if it is the case that US law has been
enormously influential in the world—in contract drafting, in commercial law, in
constitutional law—this does not, necessarily, create uniformity American culture and
law in turn have become more diverse—the English language and Caucasian ethnicity,
once clearly dominant, are giving way to an ever more hybridized culture.
Third, we can meaningfully compare our current globalization to earlier
globalizations. We know that many current developments—internationalization,
liberalization, universalization, and westernization—are not new and therefore not
sufficient for a definition of globalization as a new phenomenon.8 Indeed, trade volumes
for example have only recently reached the same volume as they had before the First
World War. However, this is a problem only if we think that globalization describes only
our current period and are unwilling to use the title for comparable developments in the
past – in particular the 19th century.9

B.

Globalization as Theory

Even if the empirics were universally accepted, we would still find different
interpretations of these empirics, especially as they relate to law. This leads to a second
use of the term globalization—globalization as theory. Several theories of globalization
exist. What they have in common is a shift away from the paradigm that has dominated
both social and legal thought over the last two hundred years: methodological
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nationalism. Methodological nationalism describes an approach in social theory that
takes the nation state as an assumption. Wimmer and Schiller distinguish, helpfully, three
modes in which methodological nationalism occurs.10 First, they argue, social theories of
modernity have largely ignored that modernity—rationalization, the transcendence of
ethnic, religious and (to some extent) economic differences—took place not just within
the nation state; these theories also went along with a persisting ideological nationalism
that must thus be viewed as a constitutive element of modernity, not its opponent. Second,
social theory has naturalized the nation state and thereby made it the framework of its
analysis of society, rather than its object. Third, and finally, the analytical focus of social
science and theory have been restrained by the boundaries of the nation state. With regard
to the later mode, we can speak of the state as container of social processes.11
Regardless of whether or not such methodological nationalism has dominated the
social sciences 12 it seems clear that it has been predominant in legal debates. Here,
methodological nationalism translates into what is called the Westphalian Model—the
idea that the state presents the ultimate point of reference for both domestic and
international law. In this model, all domestic law is the law within one state, whereas in
international law, the only actors are states, and the supranantional institutions that states
have set up. We can see the prevalence of this model in all legal disciplines. Discussions
in public law assume the existence of one government (unitary or not). Private law has
been nationalized—not just formally, as codes (in civil law countries), but also in our
understanding of it. 13 Even law that is not national law is understood within such
methodological nationalism. Thus, international law, understood as law between states,
perpetuates the idea of the state as the only relevant reference point. Even where law is
moved to the supranational level – as is the case for the law of the European union – it
remains caught in the perspective of the state. 14 More, even where non-state law is
described as law, the concept of law used is typically borrowed from the model of state
law.15 Conflicts between legal systems are, in such a perspective, viewed as an exception;
the dominant solution in private international law is to allocate international transactions
to one state.

A Wimmer and N Glick Schiller, ‘Methodological Nationalism and Beyond:
Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences’ (2002) 2 Global Networks
301.
10

11

U Beck, What is Globalization? (Cambridge: Polity Press 2000).

For doubts, see Daniel Chernilo, ‘Social Theory’s Methodological
Nationalism: Myth and Reality’ (2006) 9 European Journal of Social Theory 9 5.
12

See N Jansen & R Michaels (eds), Beyond the State? Rethinking Private Law
(Mohr Siebeck 2008).
13

JM Smits, ‘The Draft-Common Frame of Reference, Methodological
Nationalism and the Way Forward’ (2008) 4 European Review of Contract Law 270.
14

S Roberts, ‘After Government? On Representing Law without the State’
(2005) 68 Modern Law Review 1.
15

5

Globalization as theory explicitly rejects such a nationalism and seeks for new
ways to theorize both society and law. There is no space in this chapter to address all of
these theories, 16 or even only those that are of relevance for the law. Halliday and
Osinsky, who explicitly draw on Held’s four factors, distinguish four such interpretations
that are, at the same time, models of social theory.17 The first model is world polity, the
idea of global convergence. Such convergence encompasses the law, which converges
either formally, through increased international and supranational law, or informally,
through te diffusion of laws and best practices. The second model is what they call world
system analysis—the idea of hegemonic states and actors that prevent the development
of global norms. In law, we saw this for a long time as the imposition of American laws
and institutions on the world, be it in commercial law, or in public international law.
Their third model is postcolonial globalism, the insight into the power imbalances
between powerful and less powerful countries. Its consequence is that law is perceived as
neutral and objective in the North, which creates and enforces it, while it often looks
fragmented and oppressive for actors in the South. The fourth model, finally, is law and
development, the analysis of law reform in developing countries, influenced (and often
imposed) by developed countries.

C.

Globalization as Ideology

A third understanding of globalization, finally, is yet distinct from the first and the second
one. Understood as an ideology, globalization(and its flipside, anti-globalization are
political projects, or ideal, perhaps utopian (or dystopian) views of how the world could
be. Globalization as ideology comes in a number of related variants. One variant is that
of a world community (or a global village, or cosmopolitanism) in which everyone is
connected with everyone. That world would be more homogenized and uniform, resting
less on parochial views and instead on values common to humanity. Individuals would no
longer be citizens of individual countries but instead citizens of the world—globalization
ascosmopolitanism. In law, we find this reflected in ideas of a world law and a world
court that were popular in the beginning of the twentieth century and have more recently
become popular again 18 Another variant of globalization as ideology is
neoliberalization: the idea that markets should emancipate from states and their
regulation and thereby lead to more freedom and more prosperity. The new lex
mercatoria in particular is a legal ideal expressing this idea. This is linked to the idea of
individualization—in the same way in which the state loses its regulatory appeal, so it is
argued, the individual agent is strengthened.
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Globalization as ideology is of course closely related to globalization as reality
and as theory. Not only are ideologies formulated in light of existing empirics and theory.
Moreover, both the ever-closer world community and the rise of neoliberalism are often
presented as inevitable consequences from the state of the world as it is today. This is so,
interestingly, both among proponents and opponents of these ideologies. But it seems fair
to say that such necessitarianism is false, or at least too simplistic. This is so not only
because the future can never be predicted with accuracy (this is, if anything, even more
true today than it ever has been, because of the increased velocity of globalization.)
Moreover, such necessitarianism ignores two things. 19 One is the array of alternative
developments that are possible, both theoretically and practically—alternative
globalizations, alternative constellations. The other is the degree to which globalization is
not just a force of nature but a construct of human agency—even if that agency is
decentralized and plural—and thus also, to a large extent, of law.
This does not mean that we need to reject globalization as ideology. Quite to the
contrary, if it is true that we need to rethink radically the role and shape of law in our
changing society, then we need such ideologies as a normative guidance. What we should
reject, by contrast, is the conflating of ideology and empirics.

III. Law Beyond the State
For all three concepts of globalization—reality, theory, ideology—the role of the state is
central. This is so especially with regard to law, because the state is so central to our
contemporary thinking. Thus, it seems appropriate to look in more detail at how the
elements of the state have traditionally been constitutive of the law, and how their
transformation under the impact of globalization has effects on the law as well.
Much debate in the 1990s was dedicated to the question whether globalisation
caused the state to decline, or not. For some time, decline seemed more plausible in view
of the rise of non-state actors like multinational enterprises (MNEs) and NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs), regulatory competition and the ensuing limitations
on state’s policy discretion, the rise of neoliberalism. Soon, this literature of the decline
of the state spurred as counter debate that emphasized either that states had remained
strong, or that they had even been strengthened by globalization.20
That dichotomy of decline and stability was unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons.
First, looking at “the” state as an abstraction from real states has always been a problem,
especially so in international law. It becomes more of a problem in discussions of
globalization’s impacts. Whatever we understand globalization to mean, its effects on
countries like the United States or China are undoubtedly different from those on Somalia
or Andorra, and so on.
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Second, asking what impact globalization has on states implies that globalization
is an external factor. The question thus ignores the extent to which states (in large part
through their law) are among the institutions that create and shape globalization.21 The
same is true for many discussions of law and globalization: law is viewed as a recipient
of globalization, although law is also one of the most important shapers of globalization.
For example, international trade does not occur prior to state regulation; rather,
liberalized trade regulations and treaties (first and foremost the WTO) have made it
possible. Similarly, the internet is not external to the state and never has been; it was
established with strong support by the US government; its functioning today is
guaranteed by a myriad of legal regulations.
Third, the dichotomy of decline/strengthening is much too crude. It makes more
sense to speak of transformation of the state 22 —and then to analyse the particular
characteristics of this transformation. Of course, transformation is nothing new: the states
have always, since their inception, been transformed constantly. What may be new is the
specifically global character of current transformations. One such aspect is the so-called
“disaggregation” of the state: the insight that states are not unitary actors but combine a
multitude of institutions and actors which may deal with internationalization and
globalization in different way. 23 Another aspect is the increased number of informal
networks in which states now regulate. A third aspect is the increased regulatory
competition that puts pressure on states’ abilities to maintain their welfare systems.24
With these caveats out of the way, some general findings can nonetheless be
described.Although all states undergo different transformations, generalities can be
described, using the traditional elements of the state. Traditionally, we understand the
state to be constituted by three elements: a territory, a population, and an administrative
structure.25 The transformation of the state under conditions of globalization can most
fruitfully be described as a transformation of these three elements.
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A.

Territory

We assume that a state’s laws apply only within its borders—and that, similarly, no other
state’s laws apply here. This is unproblematic as long as domestic transactions are at
stake. But it has even been true, by and large, for questions of public and private
international law. In public international law, the idea of territorial integrity and exclusive
jurisdiction remains strong—even though it allows for exceptions, and even though the
idea of territoriality has been enhanced to include intraterritorial effects of conduct that
took place elsewhere. For example, it is now almost universally accepted that a state has
jurisdiction over antitrust violations that have an effect on the state’s markets, even if the
conduct leading to the violation took place elsewhere. Enforcement actions by the state
are, traditionally confined by a state’s borders. Similarly, territoriality has traditionally
played a great role for private international law (or conflict of laws), even though it does
not govern absolutely. Thus, the jurisdiction of courts is mostly based on territorial
connections like the defendant’s domicile, or the place of a tort, etc. Territoriality also
governs questions of applicable law: the law applicable to a tort, for example, has
traditionally been the place where the tort occurred. Such territoriality has never been
exclusive, however. Not infrequently, the applicable law is determined on the basis of
non-territorial connecting factors like the parties’ nationality.
This great importance of territoriality for the law is not a coincidence. Rather, it
reflects the great importance that territoriality has, traditionally, had for sovereignty.
Territorial integrity and sovereignty are perhaps the most important characteristics of a
state. Now, globalization challenges this importance of territoriality in a number of ways.
First, globalization often makes geographical distances less relevant. Not only has travel
become much easier, and accessible to large numbers of people. More importantly,
improved means of communication—most importantly the internet—have made such
travel far less necessary in many cases. The same document can now be edited at various
places at the same time. Global production chains are made possible. 26 And social
interaction has undergone a qualitative change. 27 Second, for the same reason, state
borders have become less important—and less effective. Previously, it may have been
possible to keep unwanted information out by simply closing borders and censoring the
press. Today, given the global character of the internet, and the omnipresence of blogs
and twitters, this has become much harder.
This has posed challenges for the law’s territorial character. The law has reacted
in different ways. 28 A first reaction is a declined emphasis on territorial boundaries.

F Snyder, ‘Governing Economic Globalisation’, in F Snyder (ed) Regional
and Global Regulation of International Trade (Oxford: Hart, 2001) 1.
26

LJ Strahilevitz, ‘Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups’
(2003) 70 University of Chicago Law Review 359.
27

R Michaels, ‘Territorial Jurisdiction after Territoriality’ in PJ Slot &and M
Bulterman (eds), Globalisaton and Jurisdiction(Kluwer Law International, 2004)
105; G Handl, J Zekoll, P Zumbansen (eds), Beyond Territoriality: Transnational
Authority in an Age of Globalization (Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2012).
28

9

Newer theories of sovereignty and of jurisdiction replace territoriality with a state’s
interests—a state is, more and more, entitled to regulate even extraterritorially when the
regulated conduct concerns a justified interest. This has meant that large and powerful
countries like the United States have begun to apply their laws more and more
extraterritorially, or to pass laws directly with a view to changing policies elsewhere, for
example on minimum wage, press freedom, and the prosecution of religious groups. A
second reaction is enhanced international cooperation to regulate trans-border
transactions. Such cooperation makes sure that rights acquired in one country will be
recognized in other countries; it thereby provides necessary stability to trade. A third
reaction is, ironically, a reestablished emphasis on territorial boundaries. Somewhat
counter intuitively, judges have begun to justify territorial approaches to the law precisely
with the increase in transborder transactions.29 In such arguments, borders change their
character. They may once have been real physical delimitations between countries; now
they have become formal entities to delimit application of the law.
Two issues are important. First, territoriality may have become less central, but it
has by no means become irrelevant. Access to water, as one of the main challenges for
our overpopulated globe, still requires territorial connections; the internet cannot provide
us with water. Distances between large cities with airports may now be bridged easily;
small outposts are still hard to reach. Fights over territorial boundaries—military, but also
legal—remain regular news topics. Sometimes such fights concern clearly important
territories, like the ongoing disputes between Israel and Palestinians over territorial
authority in Israel and Palestine. Sometimes they concern seemingly irrelevant territories
like the uninhibited Senkaku Tiaoyutai Islands, which are heavily disputed between
China and Japan.
The last example demonstrates something else. The reason such islands are
disputed often lie not in their immediate usefulness, but rather in legal implications of
sovereign authority, in particular a state’s ability to claim sovereignty over the sea around
the island. This leads to the second important issue: the role and importance of territory
remain, to a large extent, a function of the law. The internet is deterritorialized not only
because of its technology but also because of how it is (or is not) legally regulated. If
states resist this deterritorialization, they still have means to avoid it as the example of
China shows.30

B.

Population / Citizenship

The second traditional element of the state is its population. The romantic idealisation of
the modern nation state even suggests that the population, understood as an imagined
community (a people, a nation) is prior, logically and historically, to the state—first there
was the German people, then there was the German state. In reality, the order is often
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reversed, as Benedict Anderson has shown: the nation state, once it is established, defines
its own people. 31 To stay with the German example, there was long the chance that
Austria would become part of the newly founded German empire; once it was not, it was
also clear that the German people would be defined as excluding the Austrians.
The latter shows already the extent to which citizenship is a function not (at least
not primarily) of culture or ethnicity, but instead of the law. The designation of
citizenship is, traditionally, left to each state (though international law limits states’
discretion to deprive their nationals of citizenship). However, once citizenship is thus
established, it creates certain rights and obligations vis-à-vis the state. Rights include in
particular civil rights (for example elections); obligations include in particular military
service. Altogether, citizenship both assumes and creates, traditionally, a bond of
allegiance, and defines the most important part of an individual’s identity.
Globalization has an impact on this allegiance and identity as well. A first impact
concerns the sharp increase in global migration. Migration takes place both amongst the
rich and well-educated and the poor. As a consequence, in many countries, large parts of
the population are of foreign nationality. The law is an enabler of such migration—by
making immigration easy for highly coveted high achievers, but also by regulating
immigration. And the law draws consequences from the increasingly multinational
character of its populations. First, most countries have made access to citizenship
easier—at least for desirable highly qualified individuals. National identity thus turns
from a matter of fate to a matter of choice, shifting also the basis for obligations of
allegiance.32 Second, multiple nationality is gaining more and more acceptance—the old
idea that one could only serve one master is giving way to a recognition of multiple
national allegiances. Third, more and more constitutional rights are granted to foreigners
and citizens alike. Using Marshall’s triad of rights as civil, political, and social rights,33
we can see that more and more civil and social rights are extended to foreign citizens. In
the European Union, even the core political right of taking part in elections is now
sometimes granted to members of other EU countries, at least for local elections. As a
consequence, the relative importance of national citizenship declines.34
Another impact of globalization concerns non-state identities. Together with the
transformation of the state, we find a growing importance of multiple identities and
allegiances of which national identity is only one. Pierre may identify not only as a
Frenchman but also as a business consultant, a vegetarian, a conservative, a catholic, a
member of a chess club, a Berber, etc. It is inexact (as is sometimes done) to suggest that
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such a plurality of identities is a novelty of globalization. Historically, however, all such
identities were considered to be transcended by the national identity. Or, put differently:
the national identity served to enable all these identities – e pluribus unum. What
globalization increases is the degree to which such identities can be experienced in a
transnational fashion. Business consultants now work in multinational firms.
Conservatives form international alliances. Chess players meet online to play with
counterparts around the world. Ethnic groups are able to communicate around the globe.
By their transnational status these identities transcend the state which remains, relatively,
localized. States often recognize such non-state identities through their law with
multiculturalism and legal pluralism, but these are topics that will be dealt with in the
next section.

C.

Government

The third element of the state, finally, is a government, or a functioning administration.
This means, first, that the state, through its government, has the power to lay down
binding rules as laws that do not require the specific consent of the governed. It means,
secondly, that the state, and only the state, is entitled to enforce its laws—it has the
monopoly of violence.
It is important to understand the contingency of this dual monopoly of lawmaking
and of enforcement—especially because it is often misrepresented in globalization
literature. First, the monopoly is a historical, not an analytical finding. The monopoly
is an achievement of the modern state, not a characteristic of every conceivable state. The
monopoly did not exist in the Middle Ages, when multiple institutions competed. It did
not exist in Germany and Austria after World War II, or in Iraq after the Iraq war,
because the occupying powers retained considerable rights.
Second, and importantly, the monopoly does not mean that state laws are the
only binding rules in society. It has always been known that lots of non-state institutions
are able to make binding rules and to have them enforced through the state’s courts or
through arbitration. What the monopoly implies, here, is merely that such powers of nonstate institutions acquire their legally binding force only from delegation or recognition
by the state. The state is not the only lawmaker, but it is the only institution that is free to
determine whose rules should be recognized as law.
What, then, does globalization change in this picture? A first important
development comes from the increased global interdependence of states mentioned
earlier. We find more and more delegation of lawmaking powers to supranational
institutions, be they global (like the United Nations) or regional (like the European
Union). We find more and more cooperation between nations, either formal through
treaties and executive agreements, or informal through ad hoc international consultations.
Sovereignty is thus shared. A state no longer holds absolute discretion on lawmaking.
However, such cooperation does not necessarily limit a state’s effectiveness. Quite to the
contrary, multinational cooperation often seems necessary to deal with transnational
issues. Properly, one speaks not of a decline of sovereignty but of the “new
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sovereignty”.35 Much is contested here; especially in the United States, a large number of
scholars and policymakers tries to protect maximum US self-determination as provided
for in the Constitution against such shared sovereignty.36 Regardless of whether such a
defense is normatively attractive, what is striking from a methodological perspective is
how it is based in methodological nationalism: the values of the national constitution are
taken as a necessary starting point of the discussion, so the outcome—a prioritization of
national over transnational lawmaking—is almost a logical necessity.
A second important and much-discussed consequence concerns the importance of
non-state norms. Some such norms are religious, as in the question whether Islamic and
Jewish divorces should be recognized in England or Canada. Some such norms are based
in ethnicity, such as the question whether we should be more lenient with wifebeaters
who come from cultures where beating one’s wife is common. Some such norms are
economic, such as the alleged privately created law governing relations between global
businesses, the so-called new lex mercatoria. The state accounts for such rules, typically,
without recognizing them as law.37 One such mode is incorporation—the transformation
of non-state law into state law, as happened with much of canon law in the emergence of
the civil law. Another is deference—the transformation of non-state law into facts for the
purpose of adjudication, which is what happens traditionally with commercial customs,
but also quite often with customary norms of non-state communities. A third one is
delegation—the transformation of Non-State Law into subordinated law, whereby the
rules of non-state communities are simultaneously recognized and subordinated to the
laws of the state. Calls that non-state rules have to be recognized as law, for purposes of
conflict of laws, have so far largely been rejected.
It has become fashionable to refer to the new state of the law as global legal
pluralism.38 This implies, frequently, the suggestion that social realities require us to
extend our often exclusive focus on state law and call other things law as well:
subnational, national, supranational (international) and non-state law. Such categories are
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helpful, but they have obvious limits. One such limit is, analytically, that the
categorisation still defines every type of legal order by how it relates to the state:
subnational law stands below the state; supranational law stands above it, non-state law
stands beside it. Instead of overcoming the state paradigm of law, thus, the categorization
not only depends on that paradigm, it even expands it by fitting even normative orders
into it that were not traditionally its part. Second, and relatedly some of the categories are
not very useful. Non-state law, for example, is a category that must group together such
diverse phenomena as the new lex mercatoria (to be discussed later), Islamic law, and
corporate standards of conduct. It is hard to see what holds these laws together, and
distinguishes them from state law, other than the fact that they are not state law. Third,
theories of global legal pluralism often mesh empirical findings (a lot of rules worldwide
are not state laws) with theoretical conceptions (we need to theorize all of these as laws)
and ideological positions (we have to grant greater deference to non-state orders, though
how much exactly often remains unclear). Altogether, although the phenomena described
under the heading of global legal pluralism are immensely relevant, their treatment as
legal pluralism seems to be of limited use.39
One theoretical challenge, however, emerges without doubt. Traditionally, it was
possible to treat a legal system as internally coherent and ultimately founded in some
highest rule. In legal theory, Hans Kelsen referred to this highest rule (which for him was
a hypothetical one) as basic norm (Grundnorm); HLA Hart, in his sociologically inspired
theory, called it a rule of recognition. 40 Today’s world with its overlapping laws and
claims to regulatory authority, with is forum shopping and regulatory conflicts, cannot so
easily be framed as such a system. This does not mean that the old theories, established
for the state (and grounded in methodological nationalism) have become useless. It has
been suggested, not without plausibility, that the relation between EU law and the law of
individual member states can be conceived of as the relation between two separate rules
of recognition. 41 But it seems clear that the state’s dual monopoly can no longer be
maintained on either empirical or theoretical grounds. New theories of law will be needed.

IV. Transnational Law
It is too early to say whether a new paradigm will replace the methodological nationalism
that has shaped our thinking about law over the last centuries, and if so, what this new
paradigm might look like. A candidate exists, however, in what is called transnational
law. Transnational law, as a theory of law beyond the state, is attractive in particular from
the perspective of social theory, because it attempts to combine both doctrine and theory,
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and both law and social reality. In other words, it promises to fulfill the requirement
named in the beginning for an understanding of law and globalization, namely an
approach that views both as deeply interrelated.
The concept of transnational law was phrased originally around the middle of the
last century, by Philip Jessup. 42 Jessup used the term to describe a body of law “to
include all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers.
Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules which do not
wholly fit into such standard categories” This was, in other words, an understanding of
law defined not by its sources or its form but by its object, a functional concept. Although
formulated prior to discussions about globalization, it thus proved useful under conditions
of globalization. This is so because the very boundaries that transnational law tries to
transcend—those between public and private law, but also those between international
and domestic law—are precisely those boundaries that are closely tied to the nation state
and have therefore become questionable. An additional boundary was not discussed by
Jessup but has become prominent and important under globalization, too—the boundary
between (formal) law and non-law.43 This boundary is of particular importance from the
perspective of social theory, because its decline requires us to redefine the relation
between law and society. I will discuss these boundaries, and their transformation, in turn

A.

Domestic/International Law

It was described earlier how the distinction between domestic and international law was
representative for the Westphalian model and thus for a methodological nationalism in
legal theory and doctrine. In their classical conceptions, international and domestic law
dealt with different problems and would thus rarely overlap: international law dealt with
the international relations between states; domestic law dealt with relations between the
state and the individual (public law) or between individuals (private law).
This dichotomy was always fragile, but it was broken up in the twentieth
century. International law, on the one hand, came to include non-state actors, in
particular Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations.
Moreover, international law began to focus more on individuals—in human rights law on
the one hand, in international criminal law on the other. In this way, international law
came to reach into what had previously been considered internal matters of sovereign
states, and began to break up the idea of absolute state sovereignty. Domestic law, on the
other hand, has had to internationalize, the more it has been confronted with situations
that cannot be located clearly within one state.
As defined by their objects, then, international and domestic law are no longer as
distinct as they once were. Today, this is a direct consequence of globalization and the
decline of the “state as container.” Nonetheless, international and domestic law remain
formally distinct, and a theory of transnational law that ignores this formal distinction
would have to be deficient.
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B.

Public/Private

A second distinction that is challenged by transnational law is the one between public and
private law. Public law is the law that governs relations between the state and the
individual; private law governs relations between individuals. In some way, this
distinction exists in all domestic legal systems, though it has different meanings in
different legal systems44 and is less relevant in some (like English law) than in others
(like French law).45 This public/private distinction had been challenged already in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. It appeared to replicate a liberal conception of
society, in which neatly distinguished public and private spheres existed, and in which
the public (the state) and the private (the market, the family, society) would not interfere
with each other. 46 In social theory, antiliberal critique of several variants (feminist,
critical, deconstructionist, etc.) proclaimed a collapse of the distinction and emphasized
the public relevance of the seemingly private spheres of economic and personal relations.
In legal theory, similarly, the collapse of the public/private distinction was proclaimed, as
well as the public character of private law. The idea behind this argument is this: even
private law depends, for its enforcement, on the state and its institutions. Insofar as
private plaintiffs enforce their private rights, therefore, they borrow sovereignty from the
state.
It should be clear, then, that the critique of the public/private distinction is not
specific to globalization; it is a general element of antiliberal critique. Globalization,
however, challenges the public/private distinction in particular ways. The most important
of these has to do, again, with the overcoming of methodological nationalism: Once the
state loses it privileged position, public law (as the law that governs the state’s relations
with private parties) loses its special position as well. Traditional regulatory functions of
the state are performed by private actors.47 The state, on the other hand, sees itself in
competition with other states and private parties in a global market for investors; it starts
to resemble private actors.
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This becomes clear in several constellations. The most obvious one may be the
proclaimed confluence of public and private international law. 48 Another of these
emerges in international investment law, which often pairs states and investors on
opposing ends. Here, both parties have asymmetrical powers (the state has sovereignty,
the investor has assets), and it is not clear, in terms of either power or law, which is
superior.49
Another area in which the relations become unclear is party autonomy in private
international law. Increasingly, the law applicable to contracts is determined by party
choice rather than governmental interests; furthermore, commercial parties frequently
delegate their disputes to arbitrators instead of state courts. As a result, several of the
state’s core functions—lawmaking, adjudication—are, in effect, privatized. What remains
for the state is to recognize the results of such choices and to enforce choice-of-law
clauses and arbitral awards. In some ways, therefore, such party choice turns the
traditional hierarchy between state and parties on its head. This could be viewed as a
consequence of a decline of the state, as described before. But it must be recalled (again)
that this growing party autonomy is in effect a creation by the state and its laws.
It is important to see that the international/domestic distinction and the
public/private distinction are transformed simultaneously, with perhaps surprising results.
Within the state paradigm it was possible to say that all private law is public law because
the state has the power (and discretion) to enforce it. This is true, however, only for
domestic law. With only little exaggeration, therefore, we can say that all international
law is private law. And indeed, we see such developments. In the same way in which
societal institutions (like markets and families) become transnational while states remain
local, so private law is becoming denationalized, while public law remains local. The
proclaimed lex mercatoria, the alleged autonomous law of international markets, is the
most prominent example. In reality, such a reconstitution of the public/private distinction
as the domestic/international distinction is nothing new: private law was for most of its
history understood as transnational, whereas public law was always tied to the state.50

C.

Law/Society

A third distinction is highlighted especially in newer theories of transnational law—that
between (formal) law and Society and its norms. 51 This distinction has long been
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important for legal theory and practice, for various reasons: only laws are considered
binding; only decisions on law have the force of precedent; questions of law are allocated
to judges whereas questions of fact can sometimes be decided by juries, etc. As a
consequence, what counts as law was long based, at least in principle. on the basis of
formal criteria—we speak of legal positivism. This is so although the distinction was
never clear-cut: the common law, for example, is thought to emerge from custom. But
what makes it law is its recognition by the state. Nor was the distinction ever allencompassing; it was always clear that individuals are restrained not only by law but by
multiple other norms.
Now, globalization challenges this distinction. The reason is not merely, as is
sometimes proclaimed, a decline in the importance of the state as regulator. If anything,
official laws have become more important than they were in the past: the state regulates
more and more affairs. Instead, the distinction begins to collapse because the criteria used
in legal positivism to define what should count as law are becoming questionable. Legal
positivism requires an unquestioned starting point—a constitution, a sovereign people—
and this starting point is, in almost all variants, tied to the state. Once we overcome our
methodological nationalism, we are required to justify this very starting point. Moreover,
we become aware that the starting point itself is a creation of the law, not just its
precursor.
The result is that we must understand law and society as being mutually
constitutive: law is created by and in society, but law also creates society in the way in
which we find it. Empirically, this may not be a novelty. But such mutual constitution
now becomes also theoretically unavoidable. This is so because, after the end of
methodological nationalism, the state can no longer be distinguished, analytically and
theoretically, from society. It becomes a specific practice within which norms, whether
we call them legal or otherwise, is negotiated.
In a sense I have come full circle. I began the chapter describing globalization as a
vague and broad concept. I end with presenting transnational law as an equally vague and
broad concept. This parallel vagueness is, of course, no coincidence. At the same time, it
may be viewed as unsatisfactory. Transnational law does not seem very helpful: If
transnational law encompasses all legal (and non-legal!) rules, it may be thought to lose
any distinguishing potential. If everything is transnational law, nothing really is. In this
sense, the suggestion made in this chapter is much more cautious. Transnational law is
not a theory, just as globalization is not a theory. If anything, transnational law is a
description of what we find empirically as law beyond the state, and a theoretical
conceptualization of law after the breakdown of methodological nationalism.
Transnational law describes a starting point, not an endpoint, of thinking about law. Most
of the actual work of translating globalization into law, and vice versa, still remains to be
done.
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